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Abstract
In this paper we address the problem of selﬁsh behavior
in ad hoc networks. We propose a strategy driven approach
which aims at enforcing cooperation between network par-
ticipants. Each node (player) is using a strategy that de-
ﬁnes conditions under which packets are being forwarded.
Such strategy is based on the notion of trust and activity
of the source node of the packet. This way network par-
ticipants are enforced to forward packets and to reduce the
amount of time of being in a sleep mode. To evaluate strate-
gies we use a new game theory based model of an ad hoc
network. This model has some similarities with the Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma under the Random Pairing game where
randomly chosen players receive payoffs that depend on the
way they behave. Our model of the network also includes
a simple reputation collection and trust evaluation mech-
anisms. A genetic algorithm (GA) is applied to ﬁnd good
strategies. Experimental results show that approach can
successfully enforce cooperation among ad hoc networks
participants.
1. Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network is a network composed of two
or more devices (nodes) equipped with wireless commu-
nications and network capability [6] [13]. Such network
does not rely on any ﬁxed architecture like base stations
in traditional cellular networks or access points in wireless
LANs. Routing functionality is incorporated into mobile
nodes. Devices can directly communicate with each other
only when they are located in their radio range. Otherwise,
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intermediate nodes should be used to forward packets. As a
result, nodes beside sending their own packets are also ex-
pected to forward packets on behalf of others. Topology of
such network may change quickly in an unpredictable way.
Since most of the devices participating in the network
runonbatteries, thetemptationtosaveenergymightbevery
high. As shown in the literature [7] [9] [11], selﬁshness of
the network participants can be a serious threat to the net-
work. The solution to the selﬁsh behavior problem could
be so-called self-policing mobile ad hoc networks [1] [2]
[3] [5] [10]. In such networks nodes are equipped with a
reputation management system combined with a response
mechanism. Each node keeps its own rating of other net-
work participants based on own experience and reputation
data coming from other nodes. The idea of the coopera-
tion enforcement mechanism based on the reputation is as
follows. Firstly, intermediate nodes should verify the rep-
utation of the source of the packet that they are requested
to forward. If such packet comes from a node with a bad
reputation then it is likely that it is going to be discarded by
one of the intermediate nodes. This approach enforces co-
operation because selﬁsh nodes will not be able to use the
network for their own purposes unless they contribute to the
packet forwarding. Another possible approach to enforce
cooperation is to introduce economic relations between the
ability of sending own packets and forwarding packets for
others [7].
In game-theoretic terms cooperation in mobile network
can be interpreted as a dilemma [3]. Nodes are tempted to
get beneﬁt (ability of sending packets) without cost (con-
tribution to packet forwarding). However, if such behavior
is noticed by other nodes then selﬁsh node may end up at
being excluded from the network. Selﬁsh behavior would
be risk free if a cooperation enforcement mechanism did
not exist.Energy saving can be done by discarding packets or
switching into a sleep mode. However the the greatest sav-
ing is done when wireless network interface is operating in
a sleep mode [4]. The power consumption is about 98%
lower comparing to the one in the idle mode. The signif-
icantly higher idle power consumption reﬂects the cost of
listening to the wireless channel. If a node wants actively
participate to the network then its network interface should
be in the idle mode, ready to receive trafﬁc from its neigh-
bors. Being in a sleep node will not decrease nodes’ rep-
utation because such behavior will be unnoticed by other
network participants (since it is not possible to distinguish
between node being in a sleep mode and node temporally
leaving the network). For these reasons nodes should be
rewarded based on their activity in the network.
Inthispaper weaddresstheproblemoftheselﬁshbehav-
ior in self-policing ad hoc networks. Our approach aims at
enforcing cooperation using the notions of trust and activity.
We propose a strategy driven behavior of network partici-
pants. The decision whether to forward or discard packets
depends in the trust level to the source node and its activity.
Weproposeanewgametheoretic-basedmodeloftheadhoc
networkwhosegoalistoevaluatestrategies. Thismodelhas
some similarities with the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma un-
der the Random Pairing (IPDRP) game in which randomly
chosen players receive payoffs that depend on the way they
behave [12]. A GA is used to search for good strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section,
related work is discussed. Then in Section 3 we show our
trust and activity evaluation mechanisms and we explain
proposed strategy driven behavior. This is followed by Sec-
tion 4, where we present our game based model of ad hoc
network. Next, in Section 5 we describe how strategies are
evolved using GA. Simulation results are presented in Sec-
tion 6. Last Section concludes the paper.
2 Related work
A good survey of cooperation models with a game the-
oretical analysis can be found in [5]. In [9] authors present
two techniques, watchdog and pathrater that aim at improv-
ing throughput of the network in the presence of selﬁsh
nodes. First, watchdog mechanism identiﬁes selﬁsh nodes
and next, pathrater helps routing protocol to avoid these
nodes. Such mechanisms do not discourage nodes from
selﬁshbehavior because selﬁshnodes arenotexcluded from
the network. Authors show that in the network composed
of 50 nodes with presence of 20 selﬁsh nodes proposed
mechanisms can increase the throughput by 17%. In [10]
authors propose a generic cooperation enforcement mecha-
nism based on the reputation, which they call CORE.T h e
solution is addressed to networks with low node density in
which nodes are being part of a zone. The reputation is
calculated using various types of data gathered by nodes.
More relevance is given to the past observations. Only pos-
itive values are exchanged between the nodes. This way
a malicious broadcast of negative rankings for legitimate
nodes is avoided. In such network selﬁsh nodes are forced
to contribute to the network operation. All service requests
received from a misbehaving node will be ignored. In [2]
authors propose a mechanism called CONFIDANT whose
goal is to make selﬁsh behavior unattractive. Both, the ﬁrst
and the second-hand observations are used. Similarly to
CORE, packets coming from selﬁsh nodes will not be for-
warded by normally behaving nodes. Additionally, if a self-
ish node starts to behave correctly for a certain amount of
time it might re-integrate with the network. In [1] use of
second-hand information is further investigated. In [7] au-
thors present an economic approach to the problem. Net-
work is modelled as a market in which a virtual currency
called nuglet is used. In such network nodes have to pay for
the packets they want to send and are paid when they for-
ward packets coming from other nodes. Security issues of
that model are further discussed in [8]. In [12] authors ex-
amine the evolution of cooperative behavior in the IPDRP.
InoppositetoiteratedPrisoner’sDilemmainthisgameeach
player plays against a different randomly chosen opponent
at every round. Each player has a single round memory
strategy represented by a binary string of the length ﬁve.
Each player memorizes the result of its previous round en-
counter. The ﬁrst bit of the strategy determines the ﬁrst
move of the player, while bits 2-4 deﬁne the moves for
all possible scenarios in the previous round. Using GA au-
thors analyze the evolution of both cooperation and strate-
gies used by the players.
3 Evaluation of trust, activity levels and cod-
ing of the strategy
3.1 Evaluation of trust
We assume that each node uses an omni-directional an-
tenna with the same radio range. A source routing protocol
is used, which means that a list of intermediate nodes is in-
cluded in the packet’s header. In our model the reputation
information is gathered only by nodes directly participating
in the packet forwarding. Similarly to watchdog mechanism
proposed in [9] each node monitors the behavior of the next
forwarding node.
Reputation data is collected in the following way. Let’s
suppose that node A wants to send a packet to node E using
intermediate nodes B, C, and D. If the communication is
successful then node E receives the packet and all nodes
participating in that forwarding process update reputation
information about each other. If communication fails (for
example node D decides to discard the packet) this eventAB C D E
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Figure 1. Trust update mechanism example:
communication failed because packet was
dropped by node D (a), trust level evaluation
(b), coding of the strategy (c).
is recorded by the watchdog mechanism of the node C. In
such case node C forwards alert about selﬁsh node D to the
node B and then node B forwards it to the source node A
(Fig. 1 a).
Lets suppose that node B wants to verify how trustwor-
thy is node A (using available reputation data concerning
node B). In order to do this, ﬁrst the fraction of correctly
forwardedpacketsbynodeBiscalculated(forwardingrate)
and then the trust lookup table is used (Fig. 1b). As a re-
sult one of the four possible trust levels is assigned. For
example, forwarding rate of 0.95 results in the trust level 3.
If a source node has more than one path available to the
destination it will choose the one with the best reputation.
A path rating is calculated as a multiplication of all known
forwarding rates of all nodes belonging to the route. An
unknown node has a forwarding rate set to 0.5.
3.2 Evaluation of the activity level
We deﬁne three activity levels: low (LO), medium (MI)
and high (HI). Those levels are calculated using the same
reputation data as used for trust evaluation. In order to
verify the activity level of a source node an intermedi-
ate node calculates the average value of all packets for-
warded by all known nodes (denoted as av). This value
is next compared with the number of packets forwarded
by the source node. If this number belongs to a range
<a v− 0.2 ∗ av...av + av ∗ 0.2 > then the medium ac-
tivity level is assigned. Low activity level is assigned in the
case when this number is smaller than that range while high
level in the case when this number is above that range.
3.3 Coding the strategy
The decision whether to forward or discard the packet is
determined by the strategy represented by a binary string of
the length 13. An example of a strategy is shown in Fig. 1c.
The exact decision is based on two elements: trust level in
the source node and its activity level. There are 12 possi-
ble combinations of trust and activity levels. Decisions for
each case are represented by bits no. 0-11. Bit no. 12 de-
ﬁnes behavior against an unknown node. Decision F means
”forward packet” while D stands for the opposite (drop the
packet). For example, lets suppose that node B receives a
packet originally coming from node A. Assuming that node
B has a trust level 3 in node A, and nodes’ A activity is
”LO” then according to the strategy shown in Fig. 1c the
decision would be to forward the packet (F, bit no. 9).
4 An ad hoc gaming model
4.1 Description of the Ad Hoc Network
Game
We deﬁne an Ad Hoc Network Game as a game in which
one node (player) is originating the packet and some other
nodes have to decide whether to forward or to discard it.
The number of game participants (GP) depends on the
length of the path leading from the source to the destination
node. Game participants are composed of the source node
and all intermediate nodes. The destination node is not a
part of the game. Each player is said to play his own game
when being a source of a packet and is said to be a par-
ticipant of other players’ game when being an intermediate
node. All intermediate nodes are chosen randomly. This
simulates a network with a high mobility level, in which
topology changes very fast. In the example shown in Fig. 2
the game is composed of 3 nodes: node A, B and C. Node
A is the source of the packet while nodes B and C are inter-
mediate nodes asked to forward the packet.After the reception of the packet node B has to decide
whether to forward or to discard the packet received from
the node A. If node B decides to discard the packet then the
game ends. Otherwise, it is the turn of node C to decide
what to do with the packet. If all intermediate nodes decide
to forward the packet, the communication is successful. Af-
ter the game is ﬁnished all its participants receive payoffs
according to the decisions they made.
4.2 Payoﬀ table and ﬁtness function
The goal of payoffs is to capture essential relations be-
tween alternative decisions and their consequences. There
are two payoff tables. One is applied for the source node
and the other one for the intermediate nodes. Payoff ta-
bles for a source node and intermediate nodes are shown in
Fig. 2a. For the source node the exact payoff depends only
on the status of the transmission. If the packet reaches the
destination then transmission status is denoted as S (suc-
cess). Otherwise (packet discarded by one of the intermedi-
ate node’s), the transmission status is denoted as F (failure).
Payoffs received by intermediate nodes depend on their de-
cisions (packet discarded or forwarded) and on their trust
level in the source node. Generally, the higher the trust level
is the higher payoff is received by the node forwarding the
packet. High trust level in the source node means that in
the past this node already forwarded some packets for the
currently forwarding node. So it is more likely that such
node will be used in the future (when sending its own pack-
ets, routes with best reputation are chosen). This means that
forwarding for such node might be considered as an invest-
ment of trust for the future situations. When a node decides
to discard a packet it is rewarded for saving its battery live.
On the other hand, such node will lose reputation among
some of the network participants. Discarding packets orig-
inating from less trusted nodes should be better paid that
discarding packets coming from untrusted nodes. Reason
for this is that nodes with lower trust level will rather be
avoided in the future communication so there is no real in-
terest in building good trust relationship with such nodes.
The payoff table for intermediate nodes reﬂects the use
of the reputation based cooperation enforcement system by
network participants. If such system was not used, the pay-
off for selﬁsh behavior (discarding packets) would always
be higher than for forwarding. The reason for this is that
selﬁsh behavior would not be noticed in the network, so it
would be always better to save energy by not participating
to the packet forwarding.
An example of the game is shown in Fig. 2b.: node A
wants to send a packet to node D. The path goes through
nodes B and C. After the reception of the packet node B
decides to forward it and as a result it receives a payoff ac-
cording to the payoff table for the intermediate node (Fig.
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Figure 2. Payoff tables for source and inter-
mediate nodes (a), an example of a game:
node D did not receive packet sent by node
A (packed discarded by node C) (b).
2a). The next node on the way to the destination (node C)
decides to discard the packet and receives its appropriate
payoff afterwards. Finally, the source node receives a pay-
off according to the status of the transmission (failure in the
example shown).
The ﬁtness value of each player is calculated as follows:
fitness =
tps + tpf + tpd
ne
, (1)
where tps,tpf,tpd are total payoffs received respectively
for sending own packets, forwarding packets on behalf of
othersanddiscardingthem. Theneisanumber ofallevents
(number of own packets send, number of packets forwarded
and number of packets discarded).
4.3 Types of nodes
Two types of nodes (players) are used in our game: nor-
mal nodes (NN) and constantly selﬁsh nodes (CSN). A Nor-
mal node plays according to some strategy (that evolves in
the evolutionary process). Its goal is to send maximum
number of packets and save battery live at the same time.
The CSN never cooperates (always drops packets). Such
player is not included in the selection and reproduction. In
each generation the number of CSN remains the same.
4.4 Tournament scheme and evaluation of
strategies
Strategy of each player is evaluated in a tournament.W e
deﬁne different tournaments varying in some parameters
that represent speciﬁc network conditions. We call them
tournament environments. In every tournament a number ofad hoc games is repeatedly played (as described in Section
4.1). Each tournament is composed of R rounds. In ev-
ery round each player is a source of a packet exactly once
(plays its own game) and participates in the packet forward-
ing several times (as a participant of other player’s games).
A destination node and intermediate nodes are chosen ran-
domly depending on the path mode being used (see Section
6.1). Both maximum number of paths and maximum num-
ber of intermediate nodes are parameters. The tournament
itself can be described as follows:
Tournament scheme
Step 1: Specify i (source node) as i := 1, K as a number of
players participating in the tournament and R as a number
of rounds.
Step2: Randomly selectplayerj (destinationofthepacket)
and the intermediate nodes.
Step 3: For each available path calculate its rating (as de-
scribed in Section 3.1) and select the path with the best rep-
utation.
Step 4: Play the game (as described in Section 4.1).
Step 5: Update payoffs of the source node i and all inter-
mediate nodes (game participants) that received the packet.
Step 6: Update the reputation data among all game partici-
pants (as described in Section 3.1).
Step 7: If i<K , then choose the next player i := i +1
and go to the step 2. Else go to the step 8.
Step 8: If r<R , then r := r +1and go to the step 1 (next
round). Else stop the tournament.
Strategies are evaluated in a series of tournament envi-
ronments. The evaluation scheme is shown in Fig 3.
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Figure 3. Evaluation of strategies. Several
tournament environments are used.
The total number of players participating in the tourna-
ment (tournament size) is the same in each environment.
Players participate in series of tournament environments in
the following way:
Evaluation of strategies in several tournament en-
vironments
Step 1: Let E be a number of tournament environments,
T - a tournament size (a number of players participating
in each tournament), N - population size (a number of
normal nodes) Si - a number of selﬁsh players in the
i−th environment, Pi- a number of normal nodes in each
environment (Pi= T − Si) and L - number of times every
player plays in each of the tournaments. Clear the memory
(reputation/activity data) of all N players and specify i as
i := 1.
Step 2: Randomly choose Pi players among all players
that played less then L times in the current environment.
Step 3: Play the tournament in the i − th environment (as
described in Section 4.4).
Step 4: If all players already played the i−th environment
L times, then go to the Step 5. Otherwise, go to the step 2.
Step 5: If i<E , then i := i +1and go to the step 2. Else,
stop the evaluation.
5 Evolution of the behavior using GA
In order to analyze behavior of the network under par-
ticular conditions and to search optimal strategies we ap-
ply similar evolutionary technique as in IPDRP problem
[12] except that we use a tournament selection instead of
a roulette one. There are N players participating in all de-
ﬁned tournaments. At the beginning of the evolution ran-
domly generated strategies are assigned to each of N play-
ers. Then, the series of tournaments are executed accord-
ing to the scheme described in Section 4.4. Next, selection
and reproduction operators are applied on the current pop-
ulation of strategies: ﬁtness value of each player’s strategy
is calculated as the average payoff obtained in all the tour-
naments. Then N pairs of strategies are selected using a
tournament selection. The new strategies are obtained by
applying crossover and mutation operators to each of N se-
lected pairs. Standard one-point crossover is used. One of
the two strategies created after crossover is randomly se-
lected to the next generation. Finally, the standard uniform
bit ﬂip mutation is applied. As a result a new population of
strategies for each player is created. The process is repeated
for a predeﬁned number of times.
6 Experiments
6.1 Conditions of experiments
Tournament environments: in order to test strategies
in various networking conditions we deﬁned four tourna-
ment environments, called TE1, TE2, TE3 and TE4. TheTable 1. Parameters of tournament environ-
ments (TE).
TE1 TE2 TE3 TE4
number of CSN 0 10 25 30
number of normal nodes 50 40 25 20
Table 2. Probability of selecting a particu-
lar number of hops to the destination (path
length).
Shorter paths longer paths
2 hops 0.2 0.1
3-4 hops 0.3 0.1
5-8 hops 0.05 0.1
9-10 hops 0.00 0.15
only difference between them is the number of CSN play-
ers. Numbers of CSN associated with each environment are
shown in Tab. 1.
A number of players: the total number of normal nodes
(population size) is 100. Number of players (both NP and
CSN) participating in each tournament environment is 50.
The exact proportion of particular type of players depends
on the tournament environment.
Selecting paths: path modes. When a node wants to
send a packet (when playing its own game) ﬁrst, a path
length (number of hops) is chosen and next the number of
available paths of previously selected length is randomly
generated. Path length is chosen according to predeﬁned
probabilities. The number of hops from the source node to
the destination varies from 2 to 10. We use two path modes
(referred later as shorter (SP) and longer path modes (LP))
differing in the probability of selecting particular number of
hops leading from the source node to the destination. The
ﬁrst mode has a higher probability of selecting shorter paths
while the second one has a higher probability of selecting
longer paths. These probabilities are shown in Tab. 2. Ad-
ditionally, for each path length a number of available alter-
nate paths to the destination is available according to the
probabilities shown in Tab.3. In general, the longer the path
is, more likely less routes to the destination are going to be
available.
Parameters of GA. The following parameters of GA
are used: crossover probability: 0.9; mutation probability
0.001; number of rounds in the tournament: 300; number of
generations: 500. The unknown nodes have a default trust
value assigned to 1. All the experiments are repeated 60
times and the average value is taken as a result.
Evaluation cases. We examine theevolution of behavior
Table 3. Probability of the number of available
paths for each path length.
1 path 2 paths 3 paths
2-3 hops 0.5 0.3 0.2
4-6 hops 0.6 0.25 0.15
7-8 hops 0.8 0.15 0.05
Table 4. Parameters of evaluation cases.
tournament environment path mode
case 1 1( C S N ) shorter paths (SP)
case 2 3( 3 0C S N ) shorter paths (SP)
case 3 1-4 shorter paths (SP)
case 4 1-4 longer paths (LP)
among network participants in four cases. In the ﬁrst two
cases players are evaluated in only one environment while
in cases 3 and 4 players are evaluated in all environments.
For cases 1-3 paths are chosen according to the shorter path
mode while for case 4 a longer path mode is used (Tab. 4).
6.2 Results: evolution of cooperation
We deﬁne cooperation level as a percentage of pack-
ets that originated by normal nodes and than successfully
reached the destination. The results for all evaluation cases
are shown in Fig. 4. When players play in the CSN free
tournament (case 1), the level of cooperation reaches about
97%. On the contrary, when most of the population (60%)
is composed of CSN (case 2, 30 CSN) the cooperation level
drops to about 19% (which means that only 19% of packets
originated by non-CSN nodes reach the destination). When
players are evaluated in all tournament environments (third
and fourth evaluation case) the cooperation level reaches
38% and 54% respectively.
The case in which there are no CSN simulates a situa-
tion in which all nodes try to minimize the use of battery
but at the same time they want to send the maximum possi-
ble number of packets. So, if the selﬁsh behavior does not
allow sending the desired number of packets then the node
is modifying its strategy to the more cooperative one. In
the CSN-free environment (case 1) on can see that nodes
decide to cooperate (and as a result gain trust) for most of
the times because it is the only way to use the network for
its own purposes. With the presence of CSN, nodes become
more restrictive to the less trusted nodes. This is proba-
bly because they ”learn” that nodes with low trust will not
change its behavior (which is only true for CSN). The CSN
nodes are not interested in sending its own packets so the
cooperation enforcement system will not convince them to
participate in packet forwarding.Table 5. Cooperation levels measured inde-
pendently for each environment for evalua-
tion cases 3 and 4.
Coop. lev Coop. lev CSN-free CSN-free
in case 3 in case 4 paths paths
in case3 in case4
TE1 99% 99% 100% 100%
TE2 66% 41% 66% 41%
TE3 28% 7% 29% 12%
TE4 19% 5% 20% 8%
Figure 4. The evolution of cooperation.
Additional results for third and fourth evaluation cases
are shown in Tab.5. These results are taken from the last
generations (average value of all experiments). In the sec-
ond and third columns one can see the cooperation levels
measured independently for each tournament environment.
The percentage of paths that did not contain CSN is shown
in the last two columns. When sending packets, normal
nodes try to avoid CSN by choosing paths with the best rep-
utation. Its not always possible and depends mainly on two
factors: number of CSN and a path length. The difference
in cooperation level between evaluation cases 3 and 4 was
related to the fact that in case 4 it was much more difﬁcult
to avoid CSN (longer paths mode used). For example, in
TE4 only 8% paths did not contain CSN, while in case 3
it was 20%. This resulted in cooperation levels of 5% and
19% respectively (in TE4).
In Tab.6 one can see how forwarding requests coming
from normal nodes and CSN were treated in the network in
evaluation cases 3 and 4. We deﬁne a forwarding request
as a situation in which a node is asked to forward a packet.
Table 6. Response to packet forwarding re-
quests coming from normal nodes and CSN.
Results for evaluation case 3 (EC3) and case
4 (EC4) are shown.
Requests from Requests from
normal players CSN
EC3, (EC4)
Req. accepted 77, (78)% 4, (3)%
Req. rejected by NP 0.23, (3.5)% 53, (49)%
Req. rejected by CSN 22, (18)% 43, (47)%
Table 7. Most popular strategies for the eval-
uation case 3 and 4.
Shorter paths Longer paths
(eval. case 3) (eval. case 4)
010 101 101 111 1 010 000 111 111 1
000 111 111 111 1 000 000 111 111 1
000 111 101 111 1 000 010 111 111 1
000 011 111 111 1 000 000 101 111 1
010 011 101 111 1 010 000 101 111 1
Around 77% of requests coming from normal nodes were
accepted. Most rejections came from CSN (18-22%, de-
pending on the evaluation case). The main difference was
in rejection of packets originated by normal nodes. In the
evaluation case 3 only 0.23% of such requests were rejected
by normal nodes, while in the evaluation case 4 more than
3% packets were dropped. The acceptance percentage of
requests coming from CSN was only around 4% in both
cases.
6.3 Winning strategies
During the evolutionary process the initial randomly
generated strategies evolved and as a result the cooperation
level in the network decreased. Several strategies emerged
inthelastgenerationsofourexperiments. InTab.7ﬁvemost
popular strategies for both evaluation cases are shown. One
can see that a decision against an unknown player (last bit)
is to forward. As a result, new nodes can easily join the
network and start sending own packets.
It is easier to analyze the global tends by looking at sub-
strategies (strategy for each trust level). The results for
the evaluation case 3 and 4 are shown in Tab.8 and Tab.9.
Only sub-strategies that appeared in more than 3% of ﬁnal
populations are shown. For trust level 3 the same strategy
dominated: ”111 - always forward”. The activity level of
a source node is not taken into account at this trust level.
For trust 2 strategies evolved for case 4 were slightly moreTable 8. Evolved sub-strategies for the case 3
(short paths).
Trust 0 Trust 1 Trust 2 Trust 3
010 (40%) 101 (33%) 101 (35%) 111 (99%)
000 (33%) 111 (25%) 111 (27%) -
001 (11%) 011 (20%) 001 (21%) -
011 (16%) 001 (19%) 011 (17%) -
Table 9. Evolved sub-strategies for the case 4
(long paths).
Trust 0 Trust 1 Trust 2 Trust 3
000 (54%) 000 (53%) 111 (51%) 111 (99%)
010 (45%) 010 (34%) 101 (37%) -
- 100 (8%) 001 (7%) -
- - 011 (5%) -
cooperative: 93% of strategies said to forward packets for
at least two activity levels, while for case 3 about 79% were
in favor of cooperation in such case. This situation changes
for the trust level 1. Strategies that evolved for the case 4
were by far less cooperative. The dominating strategy was
”000 - newer cooperate, 53%” while strategies that allowed
cooperation (in only one activity level - 010 and 100) were
present in 42% of last populations. For the case 3 cooper-
ative level was only slightly lower than for trust 2. For the
trust level 0 the evolved approach for the case 3 was slightly
more cooperative than in case 4. In general, one can say that
sub-strategies evolved in the evaluation case 3 were more
cooperative than those from case 4 (with the exception of
trust level 2, where the opposite is true). This was related
to the fact that in the case 4 longer paths were used and as a
result the probability of successfully sending a packet was
lower (since it was more likely that a CSN would appear in
the path). In such case normal nodes were becoming less
cooperative against requests coming from nodes with lower
trust levels in order to force the cooperation. All forwarded
packets coming from CSN were forwarded at the beginning
of the tournament, at the time when CSN were seen as an
unknown nodes. As the reputation of CSN decreased with
time, such nodes did not manage to send any more packets.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a strategy driven ap-
proach to enforce cooperations in ad hoc networks. It uses
the notion of trust and activity. We have found such strate-
gies using a game based model of the network and GA. Our
model of the network includes a simple reputation collec-
tion mechanism. Experimental results showed that the pro-
posed cooperation enforcement approach based on strate-
gies was good enough to enforce high level of cooperation
among the nodes that were interested in sending their own
packets. Fair contribution to the packet forwarding was the
only way to be able to send its own packets. The exact evo-
lution of strategies depends on the network conditions being
used at their evaluation. To achieve best results one should
know what kind of network are those strategies target.
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